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Regulating Public Pension Fund Investments:
The Role of Federal Legislation
Sharon Reece*
Richard Morrissey & Mary Beth Navin**
During the first part of the last decade, pension funds both
private and public were represented as being the nation's
single largest source of capital. 1 Presently state public pension
funds have accumulated assets in excess of $700 billion. 2 The
most recent projection is that by 1995 state and local public
pension funds will have assets exceeding $1 trillion. 3
The investment potential of these funds can influence both
the local and national economies. 4 The enormous capital in
public pension funds has been viewed as a possible remedy for
distressed state economies, 5 and as a source of funds to
achieve socially and politically desirable policy objectives. 6
Therefore those entrusted with the investment decision making
of these funds are being encouraged by state political leaders to
invest in local real estate, the state's infrastructure, and even
socio-political concerns like businesses started by women and

* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School; B.A. 1973, University of the
West Indies; M.A. 1975, Long Island University; J.D. 1978, Hofstra Law School;
L.L.M. 1986, New York University School of Law.
** Both Richard Morrissey and Mary Beth Navin received their Juris Doctrate
degrees from Albany Law School in 1991.
1.
See generally STUART A. BALDWIN ET AL., PENSION FuNDS AND ETHICAL
INVESTMENTS, A STUDY OF INVESTMENT PRACTICES AND OPPORTUNITIES: STATE OF
CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS (1986); See also James D. Hutchinson & Charles
G. Cole, Legal Standnrds Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and
Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980).
Trudy Ring, States Holding Their Health: Study Finds Systems Staying a
2.
Steady Course, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 29, 1990, at 21; Sarah Bartlett,
Economic Scene; States Weigh Use of Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990,
D2.
.
3.
LAWRENCE LITVAK, COUNCIL OF STATE PLANNING AGENCIES, PENSION FUNDS
AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL (1981).
4.
S.J. HARBRECHT, PENSION FuNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 284 (1959).
5.
Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 1, at 1340.
6.
See generally JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE
At:AIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980S (1978).
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minorities. 7 It has also been suggested that pension funds
could provide a catalyst for economic activity within a
particular state or region which could take the form of an
increase "in the availability of mortgages for state residents. 8
The economic power of pension fund assets has come under
close scrutiny by policy makers, and a litany of concerns have
been aired. It is believed that pension funds should widen their
investment perspectives from the classic legal parameters of
exclusivity of purpose and the maximization of returns, to
encompass considerations of responsibilities to the society. 9 In
other words, public pension fund managers are considered
duty-bound to consider the moral and ethical responsibilities to
the economy which transcend the parochial focus of
preservation of capital and maximization of return. The
argument is that a narrow focus for fund performance denies
constructive symbiosis of interests, since the growth and
security of pension funds and public pension funds depend, to a
large extent, on the sustained growth of the economy.
Beginning in the early 1980s, public pension funds pursued
investments that attempted to impact the economy of a specific
locality or region, and although many states have enacted
statutes permitting such "targeted investments,"the question
remains whether such legislation has gone far enough in the
effort to promote these type of investments.
The main objective of this study is to examine the current
legal status of economically targeted investments (ETis) and to
explore the advantages of a federal tax policy which would
supplement the States' efforts to promote ETis. To this end, the
following issues will be discussed:
Part I -The implications of public pension fund
investment in ETis.
Part II -The fiduciary and policy issues under state and
federal law.

7.
Bartlett, supra note 2, at D2. (Catherine Baker Knoll, the Pennsylvania
State Treasurer, requested that the Pennsylvania public pension funds invest in
business started by women and minorities. Pennsylvania public pension funds at
the time had assets of $25 million.)
8.
See generally LITVAK, supra note 3.
9.
For a recent example of this view, see MARIO M. CUOMO, GOVERNOR,
REPORTS OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVES'1'MENT: OUR
MONEY'S WORTH (June 1989); COMPETITIVE PLUS: A STUDY OF THE FEASIHILITY OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE GoVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON
PENSION FUND INVESTMENT POLICY (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE PLUS].
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Part III -The possible role of a federal tax policyt o w a r d s
ETis.
I.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION FUND
INVESTMENTS IN ETIS

The term Economically Targeted Investments has most
recently been defined as investments used to achieve a market
rate of return at an appropriate risk level while targeting a
specific public policy. 10 State pension fund ETis typically
include venture capital, residential mortgage programs, small
business development programs, commercial real estate and
the purchase of certificates of deposits from local banks.u

A. Public Benefits from ETis
Proponents of ETis maintain that many long-term interests, which result from a stable economy, are shared by beneficiaries of public pension plans and the community at large.
These include economic opportunities through assistance to
small businesses and job creation; the maintenance of a clean
environment; assistance to economically distressed areas; the
improvement and expansion of the infrastructure (roads, housing, health care and educational facilities); and the promotion
of research and development and technological innovation. 12
These shared benefits are urged as justification for the
availability of public pension funds to revive and improve the
economy. 13

10.
NAPPA Legal Education Conference, June 20-22, 1990 at 26 (transcript on
file with author); see generally Beverly Ross Campbell & William Josephson, Public
Pension Fund Trustees Pursuit of Social Goals, 24 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 48, 44
(198:3).
11.
STATE OF NEW YoRK, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION AND
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, IN-STATE INVESTMENTS BY PUBUC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF
THE CITY AND STATE OF NEW YORK (May 81, 1988).
12.
See gmerally INS'TJTUTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION, ECONOMICALLY TAR<iETED INVESTMENTS: A REFERENCE FOR PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS (Sept. 1989); COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9; Bartlett, supra note 2, at D2; Alfred Rappaport, The
Stayin!J Power of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, 96, 100.
The survey however reported that less than 4% of ETI programs failed to meet
benchmark returns; :3::l% met the benchmark standard; 4% exceeded the
benchmark; 87% did not have results and 22% did not respond. The data reveals
that of the retirement systems studied 41% had the expected impact and 9%
exceeded expectations. Fourteen percent had less than the expected effect.
18.
COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9.
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The Return Trade-Off

In response to investment strategies that diverge from the
basic goal of providing retirement benefits to plan participants
and beneficiaries, some argue that such investment deviates
from the literal strictures of state and federal fiduciary laws
which reflect the traditional principles of prudence and loyalty.14 In order to appease these concerns, proponents of ETis
maintain that neither fiduciary standards nor the rate of return should be compromised when contemplating ETisY The
representatives of current and future beneficiaries of public
retirement benefits urge that the sole concern of the fund trustees must be the fund's financial condition and the investment's
economic yield. Indeed they maintain that public pension funds
should not be available to subsidize the state, something that is
the responsibility of the general public. 16 This approach is
somewhat short-sighted since the beneficiaries of public pension funds are themselves members of the general public, and
the ultimate beneficiaries of a healthy economy. Furthermore,
tax revenues remain available as a safeguard to pay promised
benefits. Hence there exists an interdependence between the
fund, its beneficiaries and the state's economy.

C.

Molding the Two: Reciprocity and Inseparability

ETis may therefore be justifiable on theories of reciprocity
and inseparability. The public pension systems absorb a large
share of state and city revenues. A case in point is the city
contributions which comprise the majority of the total revenues
funding the New York City Public Pension systems. 17 Indeed
the state and cities' financial difficulties would clearly affect
the ability to continue payments to the pension system. The
security of retirement benefits for public employees (and the
interests of beneficiaries) is inextricably linked to the state's
economy and to the taxpayers who remain the ultimate guarantors of public employee retirement benefits.

BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 128-39.
COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9.
16.
STUDY COMMITTEE, RETIRED PuBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., A RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON PENSION FuND INVESTMENT:
OUR MONEY'S SAFETY (Sept. 1989).
17.
Note, Public Employee Pen;;ions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 992, 1007-08 (1977).

14.
Hi.
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There are five major ETI categories; the most common are
residential housing loans and venture capital. They represent
approximately seventy-five percent of the reporting retirement
system's ETis. Other real estate investments, small business
loans and CD's, private placements and other equity programs
are the remaining ETI categories and comprise the remaining
twenty-five percenti 8 Current data has indicated that in certain instances ETI's have achieved their targets while at the
same time realizing competitive returns. 19
II.

THE FIDUCIARY AND POLICY ISSUES
UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

A. The Fiduciary Issues
Public pension funds are governed by the laws of fiduciary
administration embodied in both state and federal legislation.20 At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Code of 1991
(IRC) is the only federal statute to regulate public pension
funds. In order to qualify for tax favored status, all public pension plans must comply with certain provisions of the IRC,
including the requirement that the plan must be for the exclusive benefit of the employees and beneficiaries. 21 Compliance
with, inter alia, the exclusive benefit rule of the IRC confers
numerous tax benefits on public employees and their pension
plans. These benefits include exempting pension fund earnings
from federal income tax, 22 allowing employer contributions to
accrue tax-deferred to the employee 23 and permitting certain
kinds of favorable distribution treatment. 24

1. Compliance with state common and statutory law
In determining whether to make an ETI, a public trustee
must also consider the need to comply with state common law
18.
lNf>'TITlTTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION, supra note 12.
19.
BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1 at 128.
20.
I.R.C. § 401(a) (1991). See generally BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12839.
21.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(1) (1991).
22.
I.R.C. § 501(a) (1991) provides that "an organization described in ...
Section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation . . . ." I.R.C. § 501(a) (1991). I.R.C. §
115 provides that "[g]ross income does not include - (1) income derived from any
public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to
a state or any political subdivision thereof . . . ." I.R.C. § 115 (1991).
23.
I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1991).
24.
l.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5) (19~-Jl).
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or statutory fiduciary rules. The obligations of public pension
fund trustees under common law standards are measured by
two prominent rules of trust law: the prudent man rule and the
duty of loyalty. 25
a. The prudent man and the duty of loyalty
standard. The common law prudent man rule, formulated in
1830 in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 requires the trustee "to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."27 These rules were elaborated on in the
1869 New York case of King v. Talbot/ 8 which provided that
the trustee must act with "sincere and single intention to administer the trust for the best interest of the parties beneficially interested, and according to the duty, which the trust
imposes."29
b. The prudent investor standard. Six states have adopted the prudent investor standard as opposed to the prudent
man standard. 30 The prudent investor rule requires,
the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, and is to be
applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of
the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment
strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives
reasonably suitable to the trust. 31

The revisions have two major effects. First, the formulation of
the basic rule gives more latitude for exercise of judgment by
the trustee than had been thought permitted by the formulation that it replaces, with particular emphasis on a specific
investment's position in the trust's portfolio and overall strate-

25.
RES'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 227 (1959); see generally LARRY
M. EH;, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAJOR PENSION AND
RETIREMENT PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE FIFTY STATES (June 6, 1980).
26.
26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1831).
!d. at 461.
27.
28.
40 N.Y. 76, 85 (1869).
29.
ld. at 85-86. See also Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N.Y. 339 (1881); Coyne v.
Weaver, 84 N.Y. 386, 391 (1881); Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 501, 511 (1883).
30.
The six states which have adopted an updated rule of prudent investing are
California, Delaware, Georgia, Tennessee, Minnesota and Washington. RESTATEMENT
(THIHDJ OF TRUS'TS General Notes, at 70 (Proposed Final Draft 1990).
RES'TATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Proposed Final Draft 1990).
31.
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gy rather than viewing it in isolation. 32 Second, revisions in
the prudent man standard allow "expert trustees to pursue
challenging, rewarding, nontraditional strategies when appropriate to the particular trust."33
ETis may represent one of the nontraditional investment
strategies which the prudent investor standard was designed to
accommodate and might be appropriate for public pension
funds. The prudent investor rule also does not make any investment imprudent per se. 34 As pointed out in the comments
to the Restatement 3rd of Trusts, social or political considerations "may properly influence the investment decisions of a
trustee to the extent permitted by the terms of the trust or by
consent of the beneficiaries."35 By allowing the consideration
of social factors the prudent investor standard appears almost
to support public pension funds desiring to invest in ETis.

2. The role of ERISA
Some statutes specifically incorporate the fiduciary rules of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). 36 However, public pension plans are regulated by
ERISA only to the extent the relevant statutes specifically
incorporate ERISA's fiduciary rules. 37 The fiduciary rules set
forth in Section 404 of ERISA have three main elements: The
exclusive purpose rule, 38 the prudent man rule 39 and the diversification requirement. 40 The exclusive benefit rule of ERISA
(to the extent ERISA is incorporated in state statutes), and the
exclusive purpose rule of the IRC present a challenge to the
public plan investor. ERISA's concept of prudence requires

32.
RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Forward (Proposed Final Draft 1990).
33.
RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Introduction (Proposed Final Draft 1990).
34.
ld.
35.
RES"''ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227, General Notes, at 78 (Proposed
Final Draft 1990).
36.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
as amended, regulates private pension plans and specifically exempts governmental
plans from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1991).
37.
An example of a statute permitting ETis but relying on ERISA fiduciary
rules is Arkansas. ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-3-41la (Michie 1989). Fiduciaries of public
retirement systems are required to conform to the prudent investor rule as interpreted and defined by ERISA.
38.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1991).
39.
29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(B) (1991).
40.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(C) (1991).
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fiduciaries to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims . . . "41
In essence, these standards require the plan fiduciaries to
discharge their duties "solely in the interest" of participants
and beneficiaries and for "the exclusive purpose" of providing
participants and beneficiaries with retirement benefits. 42 This
requires that pension funds be held and administered with
complete loyalty to the exclusion of all other interests and with
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust. A literal
interpretation of the legal constraints would seem to preclude
ETis. However some observers have concluded that ERISA's
fiduciary rules permit trustees of pension funds to take into
account collateral and incidental benefits to participants and to
the society in making investment decisions. 43

3.

The incidental benefit concept

Courts have also endorsed the incidental benefit concept.
In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 44 the court held that the exclusive
benefit rule was not violated where the trustees action incidentally benefitted nonparticipants. 45 The hope is that ETis will
have an incidental benefit effect, assist specific targeted communities, possibly where beneficiaries reside, and also assist in
the rejuvenation of the state's economy.
An analysis of the interrelationship between ETis and the
exclusive benefit rule is largely academic where ETis generate
market or in excess of market rate of returns. However where
ETis have a higher than normal risk and do produce less than
the market return, the absolute prohibition of the duty of loyalty and the exclusive benefit rule proscribes the investment
even if a targeted group or the state's economy could be assisted by the investment. Without a relaxation of fiduciary rules,
public pension funds could make no sacrifice of return without

41.
See 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(l)(A) (1991).
42.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1991).
43.
Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment
and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). For an opposing
viewpoint see Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 1.
44.
680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
45.
ld.
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violating fiduciary obligations. This possibility could strike the
death knell for ETis during periods in which they can be most
beneficial. In fact, participants are also unprotected if the tolerance of a sacrifice in violation of the exclusive benefit rule
contained in the IRC, results in the loss of tax-exempt status.
Therefore the relaxation of the rules to permit a carefully delineated sacrifice threshold for the permitted percentage of public
pension funds that can be the focus of ETis, also protects the
participants. The degree to which the fiduciary rules should
accommodate such relaxation, should be left to the legislatures
in the same way that statutes carve out a percentage of public
funds that can be used for ETis.

B.

The Policy Issues

A relaxation of fiduciary rules in the context of ETis will in
fact protect the beneficiaries from the tax impact of the violation of the fiduciary rules. ETis may realistically entail some
sacrifices from a risk/return analysis, and ETis by their very
nature have a dual mission. This differs from traditional investments which focus solely on a risk return analysis. Their
goals are different and therefore the standards governing them
should reflect this difference in order for ETis to have their
own "imprimatur." When ETis are being contemplated, the
debate should address the possibility of higher risks and the
possibility of less than market return. There is no current precedent allowing sacrifices in the context of ETis.
The infusion of public pension funds to bolster a state's
economy can be accomplished either ( 1) during a period of financial distress as a therapeutic measure or (2) systematically
as a possible prophylactic approach. Economically targeted
investments are more systematic and maintenance-orientated
and hence emphasize the latter approach to a state's chronic
economic condition.

1. Pension funds as a therapeutic measure
In Withers v. Teacher's Retirement System, 46 public pension funds were used as a therapeutic measure when New York
City's economy was facing imminent disaster. In Withers, retiree beneficiaries of the New York City School Teacher's Pension
Fund, the Teacher's Retirement System (TRS), challenged the
46.

447 F.Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a{fd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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decision of the plan trustees to purchase $860 million of New
York City Bonds as part of a plan to thwart the imminent
bankruptcy of New York City in late 1975. The TRS trustees
acknowledged in testimony that although the purchase was a
legal risk, bankruptcy, and its inevitable sequel, was not a
tolerable alternative, and therefore, on balance, the purchase of
the highly speculative bonds was justified.
The court upheld the trustees' action even though the
bonds bore such a high risk of default that they would not have
satisfied the prevailing prudent person standards, and the
excessive purchase may have even breached the duty to diversify. The Withers court, however, justified the TRS purchase on
the grounds that the trustee's major concern was protecting the
source of the plan's funding, that is the city itself.
Although the court in Withers declared that the sole interest of the beneficiaries motivated the decision and neither the
protection of the jobs of the city's teachers nor the general
public welfare were factors which spurred the trustees in their
investment decisions, 47 the inseparability of the interests of
the economy and that of the beneficiaries precluded the interests of the beneficiaries from being the sole objective of the
investment decision. In recognition of the potential violation of
the exclusive benefit standards, legislation specifically permitting the investment and relaxing the fiduciary rules was enacted.4s
The rationale of the Withers case may not be directly applicable to ETis since the Withers case arose in the context of an
emergency. The response in the Withers case represents atherapeutic approach which included court-ordered use of the public
pension funds coupled with distress legislation both at the
federal and state levels to legitimize the investment.

2. Pension funds as a systematic approach
ETis are designed to provide a program of systematic investment of a portion of public pension funds in a state's economy as a possible prophylaxis against economic disaster. Relax-

47.
ld. at 1258-59.
4R
ld. at 1260 (upholding Act of March 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-2:36, 90 Stat.
2:1R and Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-497, 92 Stat. 166.5. The statutes
essentially provided that if the New York City Employees Retirement System
(NYCERS) purchased Municipal Assistant Corporation (MAC) bonds, such action
would not violate I.R.C. § 401(a)).
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ation of the application of the exclusive benefit rule was allowed in Withers when the public plan's source of funds was
tethering on bankruptcy. It seems that explicit legislation
would be necessary to justify the systematic program of ETis
outside the context of imminent bankruptcy.
Hence, there are no objective guidelines to determine the
level of danger on a continuum of decline in a state's economy
that will justify a court's decision that an investment to preserve the state's economy is prudent, albeit risky. Therefore,
reliance on a court order may not be a viable strategy. The systematic investment of a limited percentage of assets by public
pension funds in ETis should not only be encouraged but
should receive explicit sanction under the rules of loyalty and
prudence. ETis could be prudent investments provided fund
managers determine that they are not excessively risky, would
not result in radically reduced returns and would benefit targeted communities, while protecting the ability of the state to
ultimately provide the promised retirement benefits. The fact
the ETis may not always provide the same risk and return as
traditional investments must be specifically addressed and
accommodated.
a. Accommodating less than market returns under a systematic approach. In Brock v. Walton, 49 the court held that
although ERISA trustees were required to charge a reasonable
rate of interest on loans to pension plan participants, an interest rate below market rate did not violate that directive. Some
facts that were central to the court's decision include the fact
that the trustees researched interest rates thoroughly before
making the decision, sufficient safeguards like mortgage insurance were in place, and the loans were a small part (less than
ten percent) of the fund's portfolio. 5° Likewise, a below market
rate for ETis may be defensible where the investments are
thoroughly screened and represent a de minimis part of a
fund's portfolio. Adequate safeguard lies in the taxing power
available to assist public funds in meeting their obligation to
provide retirement benefits.
b. Other considerations under a systematic
approach. Currently, the interrelationship between ETis and
the fiduciary rules remain unclear. It is difficult, indeed impossible, for a trustee to safely reconcile the responsibilities of
49.
50.

794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 588.
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the duty of loyalty while at the same time maintaining sensitivity to the economic condition of the state.Statutory authority
to consider a more diversified menu of investment options and
objectives, including ETis coupled with adherence to the traditional fiduciary concepts, are contradictory and pose a real
dilemma. On the one hand, specific legislative encouragement
is granted to consider state economic development in the investment decision making process. On the other hand, ETI
proponents maintain that these investment objectives in no
way compromise the traditional legal investment standards of
prudence and loyalty (the exclusive benefit rule). 51
In the 1980s, New York State encouraged its public pension funds to invest in the State's economic growth. 52 However without legislative certainty concerning the application of
the fiduciary rules to ETis, such investments may be more
risky from a legal perspective.
Permissive legislation promoting ETis may not achieve the
desired goals without some liberalization of the exclusive purpose rule within a narrow context. Since violation of the exclusive benefit rule under the IRC may lead to loss of tax-exempt
status which will impact on the beneficiaries themselves, a
federal policy towards ETis should be addressed in the IRC. All
parties will benefit from a clear definition of the applicability of
the fiduciary rules with respect to the percentage of public
pension funds which some states permit for ETis. The exclusive
benefit requirement precludes consideration of the health of the
state in investing public pension funds. Therefore, statutes
should provide that in making ETis, a fund trustee's consideration of the economic health of the state will not necessarily
violate the exclusive benefit rule. Clarification of the fiduciary
standards was deemed necessary to justify certain risky investments to maintain the economic viability of New York City. 53
Such legislation would be even more imperative for systematic
ETis. Statutes that permit ETis but maintain that the traditional standards of prudence and loyalty must be adhered to
can therefore operate at cross purposes to create uncertainty in
the investment process.
The exclusive benefit rule should be modified to accommo-

See COMPETITIVE PLUS, supra note 9.
See N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177{7) (McKinney 1987).
N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 179(a) (McKinney 1987) (declaring MAC
.
bonds to be a prudent investment).
51.
52.
53.
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date the permitted percentage of ETis contained in many statutes. Such modifications would create legal certainty if conside_rations of the economic health of the state are considered pertment and are used as criteria for public fund investment. This
would also protect the fund manager if the ETI results in a
sacrifice in terms of economic return on the investment.

C.

Implication of These Factors for The Internal Revenue Code

Certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code reinforce
the common law fiduciary principles that apply to public pension plans. The tax benefits that flow to the beneficiaries of a
public pension plan are conditioned on the plan being maintained for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries. 54 The Treasury Regulations reinforce this mandate
by providing that "'purposes other than for the exclusive benefit
of his employees or their beneficiaries' includes all objects or
aims not solely designed for the proper satisfaction of all liabilities to employees or their beneficiaries covered by the trust."55
An Internal Revenue Service ruling has interpreted the
exclusive benefit rule to permit some collateral benefit to others provided the investments have the primary purpose of benefiting employees or their beneficiaries. 56 The ruling however
requires that: the cost must not exceed the fair market value at
the time of purchase; a fair return commensurate with the
prevailing rate must be provided; sufficient liquidity must be
maintained to permit distributions in accordance with the
terms of the plan; and the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would adhere to are present.
Although it may appear that economically targeted investments which meet the requisites of the aforementioned ruling
would not run afoul of the exclusive benefit rule of Section
401(a), revenue rulings do not have the authority and general
applicability of a statute or regulation. In addition, ETis may
not always measure up to the conditions of the ruling even
though they may be justifiable from an economic perspective.
Investing money in long term projects at a rate of return that
may not be commensurate with the risk in the hope that improvement of the local economy indirectly benefits plan benefi-

fi4.
55.
56.

I.R.C. § 401(a) (1991).
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)Ul) (1991) (emphasis added).
Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. R8.
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ciaries may compromise the "primary purpose" standard of the
ruling. In addition, most public pension plans are under-funded57 and therefore do not maintain sufficient liquidity to permit distributions in accordance with terms of the plan at all
times. It is not enough for ETis to be pursued with the notion
that such investments will not be challenged. Amendments are
necessary in order for ETis to be pursued in a secure and certain context.
In 1975 and 1978, when the New York State and City pension plans were in jeopardy, investments beneficial to the City
posed a threat to the tax-favored status enjoyed by participants
and beneficiaries, and consequently accommodating legislation
was enacted. 58 In order to bring investments within the exclusive purpose rule of section 401(a) federal legislation made it
clear that purchasing the securities issued by New York City
and the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) for the City
of New York, was not violative of the exclusive benefit rule of
section 401(a). 59 Similar legislation is needed to promote and
legalize systematic uses of ETis.
Ill. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REQUIRE
PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT IN ETis
In analyzing the effects of a federal tax policy to promote
ETis, certain constitutional issues must be addressed. The
principal federal regulations applicable to state and local government pension plans are those contained in the Internal Revenue Code. Tax-exempt status is conditioned on adherence to
these rules. In general, the disqualification of a pension plan
results in the employer losing immediate deductibility of contributions to the plan. The trust income then becomes taxable,
and employees are taxed on employer contributions made on

57.
Alicia H. Munnell, The Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public
Pensions and Housing, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept./Oct. 1983, at 20 (citing
LITVAK, supra note 3).
58.
Such special legislation was enacted in 1976 and in 1978. Act of March 19,
1976, Puh. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 9fi-497,
92 Stat. 1665; The statutes provide that if certain New York State and City
pension funds, including NYCERS, took certain action they nevertheless would not
be deemed to have failed to satisfy the requirements of § 40l(a) or to have engaged in prohibited transactions under § 503(b) of the IRC. These actions include
entering certain securities purchase agreements and purchasing, under such agreements, securities of the City and MAC.
59.
Act of March 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-497, 92 Stat. 1665;

101]

PUBLIC PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS

115

their behalf to the extent they are vested. A public plan's tax
qualification status, however, essentially only benefits only
participants and beneficiaries, because States and their instrumentalities are not subject to direct federal taxation. 60 I t
i s
axiomatic that tax exemptions and deductions are matters of
"legislative grace,"61 and a form of tax subsidy, 62 which no
citizen can claim as a matter of constitutional right. If the exercise of the taxing power is itself constitutional, an exemption
from the tax conditioned on compliance with Congressional
mandates that are not in themselves constitutionally offensive
would a fortiori be constitutional. 63The issue to be discussed
in this section is whether Congress can constitutionally link the
portion of public funds designated by states as acceptable for
ETis to its tax qualification status. Congress would be regulating the investment of ETis by using its taxing power to create an incentive for such investments. This would depoliticize
the issue at the state level and be of uniform applicability.
The power of Congress to tax and spend for the general
welfare is plenary. 64 "Congress ... has a substantive power to
tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it
shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare ...."65
Not only does the power to tax "reach[ ] every subject" (except
exports), 66 but also Congress has "especially broad latitude m
creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."67
[l]n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification .... [T]he presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile
and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative

60.
I.R.C. § llli provides that gross income does not include "(1) income derived
from any public utility on the exercise of any essential governmental function and
accruing to a state or any political subdivision thereof . . . " I.R.C. § llli (1991).
61.
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 485, 440 (1984); see also
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 856 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
62.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511, n.6 (1988); Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. li40, li44 (1988).
6~j.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 501i (1988).
64.
U.S. CoNST. a1t. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also New York v. United States, 826 U.S.
572, 582 (1946).
61i.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1986).
66.
New York v. United States, :j26 U.S. 572, 575 (quoting License Tax cases,
72 U.S. (li Wall.) 462, 471 (1866)).
67.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1988).
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arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it. 68

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains
an equal protection component that limits federal legislative
classifications in much the same manner as the Fourteenth
Amendment restricts the States. 69 But the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld statutory classifications that are rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose if they neither
burden fundamental rights nor discriminate against suspect
classes. 70
Income, whether deferred or not, is a legitimate object of
federal taxation "without apportionment" and "without regard
to any census or enumeration.'m The tax linkage contemplated in the proposal at issue would presumably not interfere with
a state employee's exercise of fundamental rights any more
than any other income tax does. Nor have state employees ever
been held to constitute a suspect class. In fact the risk of pension benefit default is lower for state public employees than for
their counterparts in the private sector, 72 and the power to
tax can be exercised on behalf of the public pension plan. Under traditional Equal Protection analysis then, the inquiry
would be simply whether the classification was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
These differences favoring public plans could present a
significant basis for a Congressional decision to expose a portion of public pension funds to a slightly higher degree of risk
in their in-state investments in order to impact on a state's
68.
Id. at 547-48 (quoting with approval Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87RR (1940)).
69.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (19fi4); see also ReRan, 461 U.S. at fi42;
Schweiker v. Wilson, 4fi0 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981).
70.
Regan, 461 U.S. at 547; see also Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. :j60
(1988); Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,
230 (1981).
71.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XVI; see also United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441
(1973); Howell v. United States, 775 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985); Zweiner v. Comm.,
743 F.2d 273 (fith Cir., 1984); Hogan v. United States, 51a F.2d 170 (6th Cir), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). As stated earlier, no one has a constitutional right to
a tax exemption. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 (1988) (holding
that owners of state bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on
income they earn from state bonds).
72.
See Hogan v. United States, 513 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 836 (197fi) (finding rational basis for distinguishing federal civil service
pension plan from private sector plans in the statutory commitment of the government to pay retirement benefits).
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economy. Linking the tax-favored status and tax subsidy of a
percentage of funds designated as permissible by the states for
ETis can be justified as rationally related to the legitimate
federal governmental purpose of ensuring the continued funding of state and local pension plans, and the security of a financially stable retirement for a significant part of the population.
A federal policy reflected in using the current tax subsidy to
create an incentive for public plans to commit a portion of their
tax-free eamings to ETis will ultimately benefit the plan participants.
Although a tax is primarily a means of securing revenue,
the power to tax can involve a power to regulate. The taxing
power can serve as a basis for governmental regulation with
taxes serving as the sanction behind the regulatory scheme. 73
The mere fact that a tax has a regulatory purpose and effect
would not, without more, render it unconstitutional. 74
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."75 The
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is to be found in Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Authority. 16
In Garcia, the Court overruled the decision it reached in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 and held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act wage and hour provisions could constitutionally be applied to the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, a local government entity. 78 In doing so, the Court
rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a
rule of state immunity from federal regulation that tums on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental func-

n. United States v. Sanchez, :340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950); Mulford v. Smith, :307
U.S. :3R, 48 (19:39).
74.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 527 n.16 (1988); Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); see also Minor v. United States, 396 U.S.
87, 9R n.13 (1969); Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S.
506, 513 (1937). But see Child Labor Tax Care, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). "Every tax is
in some measure regulatory." Steward Machine Cu., 301 U.S. at 589 (quoting
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513).
75.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
76.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
77.
426 u.s. 8:33 (1976).
78.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56.
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tion is 'integral' or 'traditional."' 79 The Court reasoned that
the principal limitations on Congressional authority to regulate
state activities must be found in the structure of the federal
government itself. 80 Absent a showing of some extraordinary
failure of the national political process, "[s]tate sovereign interests are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."81
The Tenth Amendment, by itself, would apparently not
pose an insurmountable hurdle to the proposed use of the current tax subsidy for public pension plans.
In the recent case of South Carolina v. Baker, 82 the Court
rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal tax on the
interest earned on long-term publicly offered state bonds issued
in unregistered form. 83 Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan recognized that the purpose of the tax was to combat
federal tax evasion "by providing powerful incentives to issue
bonds in registered form." 84 For the states, the incentive to
issue bonds in registered form would presumably lie in the fact
that the interest earned on registered bonds would remain
exempt from federal taxation. Therefore, the bonds could be
sold at a lower rate of return. 85 South Carolina argued that
because this incentive was so powerful, the statute denying
exemption had to be treated "as if it simply banned bearer
bonds altogether without giving States the option to issue nonexempt bearer bonds."86 The Court agreed. In its Tenth
Amendment analysis, it assumed that Congress had "directly
regulated States by prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer
bonds."87
But even assuming direct Congressional regulation, Justice Brennan found "nothing in Garcia or the Tenth
Amendment [that] authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation."88
The contention of the National Governor's Association

79.
80.
81.
82.
8:3.
84.
8fi.
K6.
87.
88.

!d. at 546-47.
!d. at 550-52.
!d. at 552.
485 U.S. fiOfi (1988).
!d. at filfi.
!d. at fiU9.
See id. at fill.
!d.
!d.
!d. at .~l:j.
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(NGA) did not fare any better. The NGA argued that the statute was "invalid because it commandeer[ed] the state legislative and administrative process by coercing States into enacting
legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering
the registration scheme."89
FERC v. Mississippi, 90 a case decided before Garcia, had
"left open the possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set
some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate on·
behalf of federal interests."91 In FERC, the Court rejected a
Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal statute that effectively required state utility commissioners to adjudicate federal
rights, and either to consider the adoption of a variety of ratemaking standards in accordance with federal notice and comment procedures or cease regulating in the field. 92 In the
majority's view, the central rationale for the decision lay in the
fact that the field of utility regulation was pre-emptible. 93
Therefore, the fact that Congress conditioned continued state
regulatory activity on compliance with federal requirements
would not invalidate the act. 94 The Tenth Amendment was not
implicated merely because Congress chose to allow the States
to continue regulating in an otherwise pre-emptible area. 95
Justice Brennan was able to distinguish the situation in
Baker from that in FERC on the grounds that the statute denying tax exempt status to unregistered bonds was in effect a
direct regulation of state activities, and thus did not commandeer state regulatory machinery. 96 As such, it did not at all
implicate the residual Tenth Amendment question left open in
FERC. 97 The fact that state statutes had to be amended or
that state officials had to implement a new registration system
did not rise to the level of a commandeering of the state legislative and administrative process. 98 These were merely "inevitable consequence[s] of regulating a state activity."~ 9 Since the

R9.
Id.
90.
456 U.S. 742 (19R2).
91.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 505, 51::! (citing FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 761-64 (1982)).
92.
FERC, 456 U.S. at 769-771.
9:1.
Id. at 769 n.:12.
94.
!d. at 76fi, 767-68 n.:;o.
9fi.
Id. at 76fi-71.
96.
South Carolina v. Baker, 48fi U.S. fi05, 518 (1988).
97.
See id.
9R.
ld. at fi14-1fi.
Id. at 514.
99.
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statute at issue in Baker had already survived analysis under
the standard set forth in Garcia, it was constitutional under
the Tenth Amendment. 100
Under the analysis used in Garcia, Baker, and FERC, the
proposed use of tax-exempt status could arguably survive a
Tenth Amendment challenge. The proposal to condition tax-exempt status of public funds on the investment of a portion in
ETis is a direct regulation which ultimately benefits the state
and federal governments. Even if the proposed tax were
deemed so coercive that it would be assumed to constitute a
direct regulation of state activities, the same result might follow under Baker. There is no doubt that the power to regulate
commerce already includes the power to extensively regulate
public and private pension plans. 101 Even if a statute that
links tax-exempt status of those portions of public pension
plans designated by states as reasonable for economically targeted investments could survive constitutional scrutiny, the
proposed tax must be analyzed under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Until recently it was thought that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity absolutely precluded the federal government and the states from taxing the incomes of the other's
officers and employees. 102 The power of the federal government to tax the incomes of state employees is no longer in
doubt. 103 However, that power is not unlimited. Generally,
intergovernmental tax immunity still bars taxes that are levied
"directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminate
against a sovereign or those with whom it [deals]'. 104
The purpose of intergovernmental tax immunity is "to
protect each sovereign's governmental operations from undue
interference by the other." 105 As Justice Frankfurter stated in

100.
See ld.
101.
See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
102.
Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 113 (1871), overruled by Graves v. New York 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Dobbins
v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
103.
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 40fi (1938), overruled by New York v.
United States 326 U.S. fi72 (1946); C(. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939) (upholding state tax on federal employees).
104.
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811 (1989) (emphasis
added); see al;;u South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, fi23 (Hl88).
105.
Davi;;, 489 U.S. at 814. See also Graves, 306 U.S. at 481; M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819).
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New York v. United States 106 :
[T]he fact that ours is a federal constitutional system, as
expressly recognized in the Tenth Amendment, carries with it
implications regarding the taxing power as in other aspects of
government. Thus, for Congress to tax State activities while
leaving untaxed the same activities pursued by private persons would do violence to the presuppositions derived from
the fact that we are a Nation composed of States. 107

The importance of the non-discrimination principle was
most recently illuminated by Justice Brennan.
The nondiscrimination principle at the heart of modern intergovernmental tax immunity case law does not leave States
unprotected from excessive federal taxation-it merely recognizes that the best safeguard against excessive taxation (and
the most judicially manageable) is the requirement that the
government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion. For where a
government imposes a nondiscriminatory tax, judges can term
the tax "excessive" only by second-guessing the extent to
which the taxing government and its people have taxed themselves, and the threat of destroying another government can
be realized only if the taxing government is willing to impose
taxes that will also destroy itself or its constituents. 108

In fact, every case upholding federal taxes on state activities or
employees has expressly relied on the non-discrimination principle embodied in the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.109
In the recent case of Davis v. Michigan Department of
Treasury, 110 the Supreme Court had occasion to reaffirm the
contours of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In
Davis, a federal civil service pensioner brought suit to recover
state taxes paid on his federal retirement benefits. 111 At the

106.
326 u.s. 572 (1946).
107.
ld. at 57fi-76 (citations omitted).
108.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 n.15 (1988).
See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding non-dis109.
criminatory federal tax on interest derived from unregistered state bonds); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (upholding non-discriminatory
federal registration tax on state owned civil aircraft); New York v. United States,
326 U.S. fi72 (1946) (upholding non-discriminatory federal tax on mineral waters
sold by state).
110.
4H9 U.S. HO:i (19H9).
111.
!d. at H06.
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time, the State of Michigan taxed all retirement benefits, except those paid by the State or its political subdivisions.u~
The Court of Claims denied relief, and the Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed. 113 It rejected the pensioner's claim that the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity prohibited the differential tax treatment of federal retirement benefits, and instead, upheld the discriminatory tax under a rational basis
test. 114
Writing for seven other members of the Court, Justice
Kennedy began his analysis by noting that civil service retirement benefits are deferred compensation. 115 Therefore, the
former federal employee could claim the benefit of the statutory
immunity from discriminatory taxation embodied in 4 U.S.C. §
111. us He then went on to find that the "immunity in § 111
is coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes
embedded in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity."u 7
Michigan launched two arrows against this constitutional
attack. It first asserted that the pensioner was not entitled to
claim the immunity because there was no showing that the tax
"interfere[d] with the Federal Government's ability to perform
its governmental functions, [and thus] the constitutional doctrine ha[d] not been violated."u 8 While the Court recognized
that the immunity doctrine exists to protect governments, it
rejected out of hand the State's argument that "individuals who
are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their
dealings with a sovereign" could not on that ground alone claim
the immunity. 119 "Indeed," wrote Justice Kennedy, "all precedent is to the contrary." 120 The Court saw "no reason for departing from this settled rule." 121
Next, Michigan argued that significant differences between
the two classes of pensioners justified the discriminatory treatment. The State first suggested that the tax exemptions en-

112.
11:j.
114.
11fi.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
I d.
!d.

at 80fi.
at 807.
at
at
at
at

808.
808-809.
81:j,
814.

at 8lfi.
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abled it to attract and keep qualified employees. 122 Secondly,
The State argued that federal pension benefits were substantially more generous than those of the State, and therefore
unequal treatment was justified. 123
Justice Kennedy dealt with these two arguments by first
pointing out that traditional equal protection analysis was
"inappropriate" in this context. 124 In cases involving intergovernmental tax immunity, "'the Government's interests must
be weighed in the balance."' 125 The test in these types of cases is "whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly related
to, and justified by, 'significant differences between the two
classes."' 126 The first difference alleged by the State, its interest in having qualified employees, was simply a rational reason
for discriminating. 127 It did not go at all to the question of
whether the classes were in fact significantly different. The
second alleged difference, the relatively parsimonious nature of
state retirement benefits, would also not justify the inconsistent tax treatment. If the exemption were directly related to
this difference, the statute "would not discriminate on the basis
of the source of ... benefits ... ; rather, it would discriminate
on the basis of the amount of benefits received by individual retirees."128 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Michigan
tax "violate[ d) principles of intergovernmental tax immunity by
favoring retired state and local government employees over
retired federal employees." 129 The case was then remanded
with a "mandate of equal treatment." 130 Michigan could prospectively cure the constitutional violation either by extending
the exemption to all retirees, or by eliminating it entirely, or
more narrowly, by simply exempting federal retirement benefits to the same extent that those of state and local governments were exempted. 131
The proposed linking of tax-exempt status of that percentage of funds designated as permissible by the states for ETis
122.
ld. at 816.
12:1.
Jd.
124.
Jd.
125.
ld. (quoting Philips Chern. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist.,
88fi (1960)).
ld. (quoting Philips, 861 U.S. at 888-85 (emphasis added)).
126.
127.
ld.
128.
Id. at 817.
ld.
129.
130.
ld. (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)).
ld. at 818.
131.

~j6l

U.S. 876,
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would operate best if applied to all public pension funds to the
extent permitted by the laws that govern them. Public pension
funds are different from private pension funds since public
funds do have guarantors in the taxpaying public. The current
interpretation of the intergovernmental tax immunity prohibits
the federal government from taxing the states directly. 132 Utilizing the taxing power to assist a state in regulating and promoting ETis by public pension plans is not a direct tax on the
states by the federal government. The federal government
would be merely assisting states in achieving goals they have
already declared as laudable. However, by linking the tax-exempt status of a percentage of public funds permitted or required by states for ETis would increase ETI investment. Such
regulatory appeal was not deemed constitutionally offensive in
Garcia where it was conceded that the effect of the legislation
would be to eliminate the issuance of bearer bonds. 133 The
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity would not create
an insurmountable hurdle to the proposed legislation. States
need new initiatives in order to increase the availability of
capital needed to maintain a strong economy.
There are recent examples of the intervention of the federal government into the affairs of an entity in distress. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has set up an
unwritten policy "called 'too big to fail' - since it bailed out
Continental Illinois in 1984." 134 This policy was exercised
when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) gave special
treatment to big depositors at Bank of New England in Boston.135
If the Federal Government, through the FDIC, is unwilling
to allow "big banks" to fail it is unlikely that it would allow
states to fail with public pension fund assets in excess of $362
billion. 136 It has been proposed that if the banks are to be
rescued then the government should more strictly regulate the
industry. 137 Likewise if public pension funds would be res-

Comment, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L.
14:3, 222 (198R).
1:3:3.
Id. at 224.
1:34.
Dennis Auchon, FDIC Draws Fire (or Backing BNE's Uninsured Depositors,
USA ToDAY, Jan. 8, 1991, 2B.
1:35.
Id.
1:36.
Ring, supra note 2, at 21. The study covers 77 public pension funds in 40
states and Puerto Rico.
187.
Tresury Department Draft Bill, The Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery,
1:32.
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cued it is reasonable to regulate their investment. The House
Banking Committee stated that "more than $50 billion in taxpayer funds will be needed [to bailout the industry ]." 138 It
would undoubtedly be just as costly for the Federal Government, and in turn taxpayers, to bailout states and consequently
public pension funds. If a state's economy ends in financial ruin
this would mean that the public pension fund would also be
bankrupt in the sense that it could no longer meet its financial
obligations. On December 9, 1975, President Gerald Ford
signed legislation authorizing the federal government to loan
New York City $2.3 billion annually until June 30, 1978. 139
Prior to the passage of the bill New York was expected to default on payment of loans due December 11 if they did not receive the federal funds. 140 In October, New York had also
been rescued from financial doom by the pension funds of a
teachers' union. 141
Under ordinary circumstances, the puritans would be right to
insist that the city go through the wringer to pay for 10 years
of fiscal mismanagement and the well-intentioned but foolish
attempt to redistribute income by providing expensive services when it did not have the resources. But ... such a purge
could start a financial panic. 142

As a condition of the federal loans, Congress placed numerous
restrictions and demands upon New York City, New York State
and their officials. "The city would be required to balance its
budget within two or three years. To insure that city finances
are in order, the State would be expected to monitor city
spending, revenue and bookkeeping." 143
The federal government has an interest in ensuring that all
pension plans operate to provide bona fide protection for citizens in their retirements. That can be ensured only if the
state's economy is healthy. It might be wise to thwart potential
disaster before it begins by requiring some federal regulation of

and Enforcement Act uf 1989, DAILY REP. EXEC. (BNA), Feh. lfi, 1989.
ld.
138.
139.
1975 Facts on File, U.S. Affairs, Dec. 13, 1975 at 9::10, El.
140.
ld.
141.
Can Help From Washington Really Save New York City?, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Nov. :1, 1975, at 17.
142.
Bailing Out New York, Bus. WK., Oct. 20, 1975, at 146.
14:1.
Can Help From Washington Really Save New York City?, supra note 141, at
17.
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public pension investment in ETis.
Appropriate legislation could require that the fixed percentage of public pension funds required or permitted by states
to be invested in ETI should be done as a quid pro quo for
continued tax-exempt status of that percentage, with an appropriate amendment to IRC Section 401(a) to accommodate these
ETis as they relate to public pension plans.
IV.

CONCLUSION

ETis should be the subject of a federal policy reflected in
amendments to Section 401(a) which both links the tax-exempt
status of the portion of public funds permitted or required by
states to be invested in ETis and relaxes the exclusive benefit
rule embodied in the Code, for this purpose. In addition to the
certainty that the proposed amendments to existing legislation
would create, there are efficiency gains inherent in federal
legislation that has uniform applicability. Current state statutes should more explicitly accommodate these types of investments by public pension funds by stating the level of sacrifice
that can be tolerated in their return, since it is unreasonable to
expect that all ETis should produce market returns at all
times. The long term benefit of the investment may outweigh
any immediate sacrifice in the return. The linking of tax exemption to the portion of public funds required or permitted by
the states for ETis will promote the investment in ETis to the
levels permitted and hopefully impact on states economies.
Beneficiaries and retirees will be protected against the tax
consequences of possible violations of the exclusive benefit rule
if ETis receive specific accommodation within the fiduciary
rules. Fiduciaries of public trust funds would also be immunized from the full panoply of legal, equitable and injunctive
relief available for violation of their duties.

